Text 30 Jun 8 notes The Clash of the Positivists

"The clash of the positivists with praxeology resulted from their theory of meaning.[20] Briefly put, they held that deduction cannot give us any knowledge about the empirical world. All necessary truths are analytic; they are tautologies that are empirically meaningless. Since praxeology proceeds by deduction from a necessarily true axiom, the threat posed by positivism is apparent. Economics is supposed to apply to the world: it is not "an unearthly ghostdance of bloodless categories." If the method it uses must fail of its purpose, Misesian economics is ruined.

Mises’s most important argument against the positivists was a simple one. They purport to banish metaphysics and follow science, but their own position is metaphysical. “[T]he epistemology of positivism is itself based on a definite brand of metaphysics.”[21] If positivists accurately took note of praxeology, they would be forced to abandon their views.

Praxeology is a deductive discipline that, contrary to positivist dogma, does give us knowledge of the real world. To declare illegitimate an existing science because it violates a philosophical doctrine is itself illegitimate: Metaphysics cannot overturn science.

The force of Mises’s point is twofold. First, he himself agrees with the positivists that philosophy is subordinate to science. When he claims that a philosophic doctrine cannot overturn a conclusion of science, he speaks on his own behalf. But, more fundamentally, his argument works against the positivists even if one disagrees with Mises’s view about the relation of science to philosophy. The positivists do agree with him here: his argument is thus an effective ad hominem retort against them. They, the opponents of metaphysics, are themselves engaged in metaphysics if they reject praxeology.[22]”

Mises uses the same response to Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion. Popper, unlike the positivists, did not take all metaphysical statements to be meaningless. He instead adopted the more limited position that all scientific statements must be capable of being proved false. The theorems of praxeology, insofar as they are deductively derived from a self-evident axiom, fail this test: nothing can falsify them.

Mises’s reply is characteristically forthright. If Popper wishes to classify praxeology as unscientific, that is his affair. The proper tests of praxeology are the truth of its axioms and the validity of its arguments. Why should it matter whether praxeology meets the criterion of science proposed by a particular writer? Why does it count against a statement that it is metaphysical in Popper’s sense? Here once more Mises uses an ad hominem argument. Like the positivists, Popper contended that definitions do not describe real essences: they are arbitrary proposals for the use of a term.[23] Mises cleverly uses this view against Popper to show that his own characterization of scientific statements is an arbitrary proposal.”

David Gordon, The Philosophical Contributions of Ludwig von Mises

Quote 1 May 13 notes
Mises, almost single-handedly, has offered us the correct paradigm for economic theory, for social science, and for the economy itself, and it is high time that this paradigm be embraced, in all of its parts.
Text 14 Apr 7 notes Mises and “felt-uneasiness”

Rothbard,[…] describes how, in his economic treatise Man, Economy, and State, he took care to revise precisely this Misesian doctrine:

"[Most important was a thorough revision of the very first eight pages of the work—the pages which state the original axioms upon which the entire work is based.] The revision purged the original formulation of its definite philosophical pessimism, of the idea that human beings are constantly in a state of dissatisfaction and that man could only be happy in a state of inactive rest, such as in Paradise. Such a philosophical view is contrary to the nature state of man, which is at its happiest precisely when it is engaged in productive activity. The revised part eliminates the philosophical pessimism from praxeology." (Correspondence quoted in Stromberg 2005, xl [Intro to MES])

Accordingly, Rothbard [citation] acknowledges the possibility of “satisfaction in the labor itself,” and so grounds the “disutility of labor” not in labor’s being inherently distasteful, but in the fact that “labor always involves the forgoing of leisure,” which is also a value—though not pace Mises, the ultimate value. The fact that leisure has value for us explains why we prefer to economize on labor, thus allowing Rothbard to draw all the essential conclusions for which Mises thought he needed the mistaken Nirvana premise.

I have argued that the features of Misesian praxeology that Rand found most objectionable—its aprioristic methodology, its value-subjectivism, and its claims about motivational psychology—can be reinterpreted in ways that make them congenial to Rand’s philosophical principles while still preserving the essential points that Mises was seeking to make. Hence there is no reason for those of a Randian philosophical bent to deprive themselves of the powerful methodological instrument developed by Mises and his fellow Austrians: praxeology, the a priori science of human action”.

          — Roderick T. Long, Praxeology: Who Needs It”, p12 was written for the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies but essentially attempts to clear the language up regarding the ‘differences’. Anyway the part about Mises and “felt-uneasiness” condition is enlightening. If you’re dealing with objectivist’s who aren’t fans of praxeology/Mises formulation this would be the text to refer to.

(Source: facebook.com)

Text 9 Apr 9 notes The Austrian School of Thought

"Intellectual curiosity has a habit of breaking through, however, especially among college and graduate students. As a result, the Austrian School has flourished over the last two decades, despite severe institutional obstacles.

In fact, the number of Austrians has grown so large, and the discussion so broad, that differences of opinion and branches of thought have arisen, in some cases developing into genuine clashes of thought. Yet they have all been conflated and jammed together by non-Austrians and even by some within the school, giving rise to a great deal of intellectual confusion, lack of clarity, and outright error.

The good side of these developing disputes is that each side has clarified and sharpened its underlying premises and world-view. It has indeed become evident in recent years that there are three very different and clashing paradigms within Austrian economics: the original Misesian or praxeological paradigm, to which the present author adheres; the Hayekian paradigm, stressing “knowledge” and “discovery” rather than the praxeological “action” and “choice,” and whose leading exponent now is Professor Israel Kirzner; and the nihilistic view of the late Ludwig Lachmann, an institutionalist antitheory approach taken from the English “subjectivist”-Keynesian G.L.S. Shackle.”

          — Murray Rothbard

Chat 1 Apr 6 notes Epistemology and Mises
  • AEN: Since then, you have been the strongest defender of the Austrian method, praxeology, since Rothbard.
  • HOPPE: Independently, I had concluded that economic laws were a priori and discoverable through deduction. Then I stumbled on Mises’s Human Action. That was the first time I found someone who had the same view; not only that, he had already worked out the entire system. From that point on, I was a Misesian.
  •  Mises took the idea of synthetic a priori–the idea that there are true statements about reality, derived from axioms and logic, that do not need to be tested–from Immanuel Kant. But Mises added an extremely important insight; Kantian mental categories can be understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action. With this, Mises bridged the gulf in Kantianism that separates mental from physical; what we think from the outside, physical world.
  •  If you start with the concept of action, you immediately realize that action involves a subject and an object. Action means; I do something with something in order to reach certain goals. That implies a theory of casuality, which had been a sticking point in Kantianism and remains so in positivism. There were hints of this in Kant, but nothing as explicit as you find it in Mises.
Quote 31 Mar 8 notes
With regard to praxeology the errors of the philosophers are due to their complete ignorance of economics and very often to their shockingly insufficient knowledge of history. In the eyes of the philosopher the treatment of philosophical issues is a sublime and noble vocation which must not be put upon the low level of other gainful employments. The professor resents the fact that he derives an income from philosophizing; he is offended by the thought that he earns money like the artisan and the farm hand.
Text 7 Jan 13 notes Psychology, ethics, and praxeology: The distinctions revisited

"…When borrowing insights from multiple fields, it is important to work to keep the fields distinct in terms of methods, data, validity criteria, and applicability. Yet trying to keep fields distinct is not the same as avoiding relevant insights that could emerge from any one of them. Case in point, the above psychological research can help us remove extraneous implications from past attempts to formulate universalizable praxeological descriptions of the ultimate ends of action (leaving aside whether any such characterization at all is required for the purposes of praxeology).

The distinction between praxeology and psychology should be clearly maintained. One is logical and universal in method, while the other is empirical and interpretive. The particular action recommendations of a given ethical system are likewise yet another separate matter. Psychology says, “we observe, notice, and hypothesize.” Praxeology says, “it is/must be so by definition.” Ethics says, “one should act this way rather than that way.”

In this context, it is helpful to turn to Long’s clarification of the nature of “rationality” as used in praxeology, including which claims praxeology can legitimately make. When a praxeologist claims that all action is rational, it is a claim that actors employ means to the attainment of ends, by definition. However, an ethicist’s or psychologist’s definition of “rational” must specify some narrower distinctions or be meaningless for their purposes as non-praxeologists. Those wearing psychologist or philosopher hats might well be interested in whether people deceive themselves in their judgments or make poor judgments, but such distinctions must be left behind when donning the praxeologist’s peculiar, and historically speaking brand-new, style of hat. Long writes:

In a sense, then, it is true that agents always act rationally; but the only sense of this claim to which Mises is [praxeologists are] entitled is that agents always act, not necessarily in a manner appropriate to their situation in all the ways they actually see it, or even in the most justified of the ways they actually see it, but rather in a manner appropriate to their situation in the way of actually seeing it that is constitutive of their action. (309–310).

This third praxeological formulation finally leaves no room for distinctions among various “rational” (as contrasted with “irrational”) qualities of particular actions, as judged by any narrower ethical or psychological criterion. Instead, the meaning of “rationality” for praxeologists (to the extent it is useful at all in that role), is a universal-definitional one. As such, it is most likely of no use to psychologists or ethicists who would naturally require some narrower and more qualified definitions to work with.

This third formulation helps refine the dividing lines between psychological interpretation, ethical advice and judgment (“this is rational, that is not”), and universalizable statements about the nature of action as such. Only the third formulation is undeniable for all cases of action without any need for further inquiry into specifics of motivation, thought processes, or value scales. Only the third statement is/must be so in every case as a logical implication of what the concept of action itself means. The rest is up to the other fields…”

          — Konrad Graf

Quote 30 Sep 19 notes
Economics as it emerges from [Mises] direction, is a series of “praxeological laws,” laws which are eternally part of the nature of human action. Praxeological law, like physical laws, are always with us, and are disregarded by human beings only to their own peril. Men have learned that they cannot afford to ignore the law of gravitation, but they persist in ignoring the praxeological laws of economics.
— Murray Rothbard, Review of Mises’ Human Action, Analysis, May 1950.
Link 27 Sep 6 notes Computer simulations suggest war drove the rise of civilizations»

"Civilization is a stream with banks. The stream is sometimes filled with blood from people killing, stealing, shouting and doing the things historians usually record, while on the banks, unnoticed, people build homes, make love, raise children, sing songs, write poetry and even whittle statues. The story of civilization is the story of what happened on the banks. Historians are pessimists because they ignore the banks for the river.”
          — Will Durant

"Far from being opposed to history, the praxeologist, and not the supposed admirers of history, has profound respect for the irreducible and unique facts of human history. Furthermore, it is the praxeologist who acknowledges that individual human beings cannot legitimately be treated by the social scientist as if they were not men who have minds and act upon their values and expectations, but stones or molecules whose course can be scientifically tracked in alleged constants or quantitative laws. Moreover, as the crowning irony, it is the praxeologist who is truly empirical because he recognizes the unique and heterogeneous nature of historical facts; it is the self-pro-claimed “empiricist” who grossly violates the facts of history by attempting to reduce them to quantitative laws."
          — Murray N. Rothbard

Still, there is lots of potential value in building these models. The global database of historical events has many gaps.

No. There isn’t… beyond funding / recognition for yourselves of course.

Text 21 Sep 6 notes Proper Approach for the Social Sciences

"Here it suffices to present just a few examples of what is meant by a priori theory - and in particular to cite some such examples from the realm of the social sciences - in order to put any possible suspicion to rest and recommend my theoretical approach as intuitively plausible and in accordance with common sense.

Examples of what I mean by a priori theory are:

No material thing can be at two places at once. No two objects can occupy the same place. A straight line is the shortest line between two points. No two straight lines can enclose a space. Whatever object is red all over cannot be green (blue, yellow, etc.) all over. Whatever object is colored is also extended. Whatever object has shape has also size. If A is a part of B and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C. 4 = 3 +1. 6 = 2 (33 - 30).

Implausibly, empiricists must denigrate such propositions as mere linguistic-syntactic conventions without any empirical content, i.e., “empty” tautologies. In contrast to this view and in accordance with common sense, I understand the same propositions as asserting some simple but fundamental truths about the structure of reality. And in accordance with common sense, too, I would regard someone who wanted to “test” these propositions, or who reported “facts” contradicting or deviating from them, as confused. A priori theory trumps and corrects experience (and logic overrules observation), and not vice-versa.

More importantly, examples of a priori theory also abound in the social sciences, in particular in the fields of political economy and philosophy:

Human action is an actor’s purposeful pursuit of valued ends with scarce means. No one can purposefully not act. Every action is aimed at improving the actor’s subjective well-being above what it otherwise would have been. A larger quantity of a good is valued more highly than a smaller quantity of the same good. Satisfaction earlier is preferred over satisfaction later. Production must proceed consumption. What is consumed now cannot be consumed again in the future. If the price of a good is lowered, either the same quantity or more will be bought than otherwise. Prices fixed below market clearing prices will lead to lasting shortages.

Without private property in factors of production there can be no factor prices, and without factor prices cost-accounting is impossible. Taxes are an imposition on producers and/or wealth owners and reduce production and/or wealth below what it otherwise would have been. Interpersonal conflict is possible only if and insofar as things are scarce. No thing or part of a thing can be owned exclusively by more than one person at a time.

Democracy (majority rule) is incompatible with private property (individual ownership and rule). No form of taxation can be uniform (equal), but every taxation involves the creation of two distinct and unequal classes of tax-payersvs. tax-receiver-consumers. Property and property titles are distinct entities, and an increase of the latter without a corresponding increase of the former does not raise social wealth but leads to a redistribution of existing wealth.”

For an empiricist, propositions such as these must be interpreted as either stating nothing empirical at all and being mere speech conventions, or as forever testable and tentative hypotheses. To us, as to common sense, they are neither. In fact, it strikes us as utterly disingenuous to portray these propositions as having no empirical content. Clearly, they state something about “real” things and events! And it seems similarly disingenuous to regard these propositions as hypotheses.

Hypothetical propositions, as commonly understood, are statements such as these:

Children prefer McDonald’s over Burger King. The world-wide ratio of beef to pork spending is 2:1. Germans prefer Spain over Greece as vacation destination. Longer education in public schools will lead to higher wages. The volume of shopping shortly before Christmas exceeds that shortly after Christmas. Catholics vote predominantly “Democratic.” Japanese save a quarter of their disposable income. Germans drink more beer than Frenchmen. The United States produces more computers than any other country. Most inhabitants of the U.S. are white and of European descent.

Propositions such as these require the collection of historical data to be validated. And they must be continually re-evaluated, because the asserted relationships are not necessary (but “contingent”) ones; that is, because there is nothing inherently impossible, inconceivable, or plain wrong in assuming the opposite of the above: e.g., that children prefer Burger King to McDonald’s, or Germans Greece to Spain, etc.. This, however, is not the case with the former, theoretical propositions. To negate these propositions and assume, for instance, that a smaller quantity of a good might be preferred to a larger one of the same good, that what is being consumed now can possibly be consumed again in the future, or that cost-accounting could be accomplished also without factor prices, strikes one as absurd; and anyone engaged in “empirical research” and “testing” to determine which one of two contradictory propositions such as these does or does not hold appears to be either a fool or a fraud.”

          — Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Quote 24 Jul 2 notes

One of the ways I look at this now is that the factors we sort out and isolate conceptually for the purpose of thinking ultimately trace back to a single, integrated and complexly interactive reality. We have to do this sorting conceptually to have any hope of understanding what’s going on within the overall flow of complexity.

At the same time, some of these paradoxical causality loops stem from the particular ways that we conceptualize causation in simplified (abstracted) strands. This is “action” (must act to “do” argumentation), this is “argumentation” (needed to say the first thing about action), etc. Yet such things are all emergently interdependent and their separability is partially an artifact of the way we analyze the parts.

It reminds me of the chicken and egg problem. Here the solution is evolutionary theory. Chickens and eggs co-evolved together over geologic time. Neither came first. But look at how easily people are fooled by the question. They think one should have had to come first or just walk away mystified and forget the topic. The concepts of action and argumentation cannot really come about without each other, even though we are able to (or even must) think about and understand them one by one.

— Konrad Graf

(Source: facebook.com)

Text 9 Jul 9 notes The Consequences of Human Action

"[W]hat is so great about unintended consequences, and why may no intended consequences be studied as well? And doesn’t the accumulation of knowledge in society change consequences from unintended to intended?

Not only that: the Misesian discipline of praxeology explicitly states that individual men consciously pursue goals, and choose means to try to attain them. And if men pursue goals, surely it is only common sense to conclude that a good deal of the time they will attain them, in others words they will intend, and attain, the consequences of their actions. Mises’s emphasis on conscious choice treats men and women as rational, conscious actors in the market and the world; the other tradition often falls into the trap of treating people as if they were robots or amoebae blindly responding to stimuli.

Arcane matters of methodology often have surprising political consequences. Perhaps, then, it is not an accident that those who believe in unintended and not intended consequences, will also tend to whitewash the growth of government in the 20th century. For if actions are largely always unintended, this means that government just grew like Topsy, and that no person or group ever willed the pernicious consequences of that growth. Stressing theFerguson-Hayek formula cloaks the self-interested actions of the power elite in seeking and obtaining special privileges from government, and thereby impelling its continuing growth.

There are two ways to advance the message of Austrian economics. One is to fearlessly hold high the banner of Misesian theory to which the wise and honest can repaira banner which requires calling a spade a spade and pointing out the special interests all too consciously at work behind the government’s glittering facade of the “public interest” and the “general welfare.”

The other path is to seek acceptance and respectability by watering down the Misesian message beyond repair, and carefully avoiding anything remotely “controversial” in your offering. Even to the point of taking the “free” out of “free market.” Such a path only entrenches big government.”

          — Murray Rothbard

Text 2 Jun 7 notes Praxeology and Epistemology:

"…It is not difficult to detect that both a priori axioms—of action and argumentation—are intimately related. On the one hand, actions are more fundamental than argumentations with whose existence the idea of validity emerges, as argumentation is only a subclass of action. On the other hand, to recognize what has just been recognized regarding action and argumentation and their relation to each other requires argumentation, and so, in this sense, argumentation must be considered more fundamental than action: without argumentation nothing could be said to be-known about action. But then, as it is in argumentation that the insight is revealed that—while it might not be known to be so prior to any argumentation—in fact the possibility of argumentation presupposes action in that validity claims can only be explicitly discussed in the course of an argumentation if the individuals doing so already know what it means to act and to have knowledge implied in action—both the meaning of action in general and argumentation in particular must be thought of as logically necessary interwoven strands of a priori knowledge.

What this insight into the interrelation between the a priori of action and the a priori of argumentation suggests is the following:

  • Traditionally, the task of epistemology has been conceived of as that of formulating what can be known to be true a priori and also what can be known a priori not to be the subject of a priori knowledge. Recognizing, as we have just done, that knowledge claims are raised and decided upon in the course of argumentation and that this is undeniably so, one can now reconstruct the task of epistemology more precisely as that of formulating those propositions which are argumentatively indisputable in that their truth is already implied in the very fact of making one’s argument and so cannot be denied argumentatively; and to delineate the range of such a priori knowledge from the realm of propositions whose validity cannot be established in this way but require additional, contingent in formation for their validation, or that cannot be validated at all and so are mere metaphysical statements in the pejorative sense of the term metaphysical.

Yet what is implied in the very fact of arguing? It is to this question that our insight into the inextricable interconnection between the a priori of argumentation and that of action provides an answer:

  • On a very general level, it cannot be denied argumentatively that argumentation presupposes action and that arguments, and the knowledge embodied in them, are those of actors. And more specifically it cannot then be denied that knowledge itself is a category of action; that the structure of knowledge must be constrained by the peculiar function which knowledge fulfills with in the framework of action categories; and that the existence of such structural constraints can never be disproved by any knowledge whatsoever.

It is in this sense that the insights contained in praxeology must be regarded as providing the foundations of epistemology. Knowledge is a category quite distinct from those that I have explained earlierfrom ends and means. The ends which we strive to attain through our actions, and the means which we employ in order to do so, are both scarce values. The values attached to our goals are subject to consumption and are exterminated and destroyed in consumption and thus must forever be produced a new. And the means employed must be economized, too. Not so, however, with respect to knowledgeregardless of whether one considers it a means or an end in itself. Of course, the acquisition of knowledge requires scarce meansat least one’s body and time. Yet once knowledge is acquired, it is no longer scarce. It can neither be consumed, no rare the services that it can render as a means subject to depletion. Once there, it is an inexhaustible resource and incorporates an everlasting value provided that it is not simply forgotten. Yet knowledge is not a free good in the same sense that air, under normal circumstances, is a free good. Instead, it is a category of action.

It is not only a mental ingredient of each and every action, quite unlike air, but more importantly; knowledge, and not air, is subject to validation, which is to say that it must prove to fulfill a positive function for an actor within the invariant constraints of the categorical framework of actions. It is the task of epistemology to clarify what these constraints are and what one can thus know about the structure of knowledge as such.

While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly important implications.”

          — Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Text 26 May 3 notes Praxeology, Subjectivity & Lachmann

"In fact, the reason why the social and economic future cannot be regarded as entirely and absolutely uncertain should not be too hard to understand: The impossibility of causal predictions in the field of action was proven by means of an a priori argument. And this argument incorporated a priori true knowledge about actions as such: that they cannot be conceived of as governed by time-invariantly operating causes.

Thus, while economic forecasting will indeed always be a systematically unteachable art, it is at the same time true that all economic forecasts must be thought of as being constrained by the existence of a priori knowledge about actions as such. [37] Take, for example, the quantity theory of money the praxeological proposition that if you in crease the quantity of money and the demand for money stays constant, then the purchasing power of money will fall.

Our a priori knowledge about actions as such informs us that it is impossible to predict scientifically whether or not the quantity of money will be increased, decreased or left unchanged. Nor is it possible to predict scientifically whether or not, regardless of what happens to the quantity of money, the demand for money to be held in cash balances will go up or down or stay the same. We cannot claim to be able to predict such things because we cannot predict future states of knowledge of people. And yet these states evidently influence what happens with respect to the quantity of money and the demand for money. Then, our theory, our praxeological knowledge incorporated in the quantity theory, has a rather limited usefulness for one’s business of predicting the economic future.”

  • [37] The former Austrian and neo-historicist-hermeneutician-nihilist Ludwig Lachmann, who repeats ad nauseam the unpredictability of future states of knowledge (see his “From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society,” Journal of Economic Literature 54 (1976); The Market as an Economic Process (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), entirely misses recognizing this latter point. In fact, his arguments are simply self-defeating. For evidently he claims to know for certain the unknowability of future knowledge and, by logical extension, of actions. Yet then he does know something about future knowledge and action. He must know something about knowledge and action as such. And this, precisely, is what praxeology claims to be: knowledge regarding actions as such, and (as I have explained in my “On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundations of Epistemology and Ethics,” p.49 below) knowledge about the structure which any future knowledge must have by virtue of the fact that it invariably must be knowledge of actors.

                    — Hans-Hermann Hoppe

(Source: mises.org)

Quote 22 Apr 7 notes
My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. It is
not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to
show the impossibility of certain empirical events so that it could be refuted by empirical evidence. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to justify nonlibertarian property principles propositionally without falling into contradictions. Whatever such a thing is worth (and I’ll come to this shortly), it should be clear that empirical evidence has absolutely no bearing on it. So what if there is slavery, the gulag, taxation? The proof concerns the issue that claiming such institutions can be justified involves a performative contradiction. It is purely intellectual in nature, like logical, mathematical,or praxeological proofs. Its validity, like theirs, can be established independent of any contingent experiences. Nor is its validity in any way affected, as several critics—most notoriously Waters—seem to think, by whether or not people like, favor, understand, or come to a consensus regarding it, or whether or not they are actually engaged in argumentation.
— Hans-Hermann Hoppe

(Source: conza)

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